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Recent volatility in international energy prices has 
revealed South Eastern Europe as one of the most 
vulnerable regions to such external shocks. Under the 
current global economic downturn, in addition, the 
region’s energy-intensive industries are faced with the 
challenge of the weakening demand for their outputs. 
This paper casts light on the relationship between the 
price and the demand for energy. Based on firm level 
data, it is shown that the price elasticity of industrial 
energy demand is about −0.4 on average. There are a 
number of data issues to interpret the results correctly. 
This paper—a product of the Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department, Sustainable Development 
Network—is part of a larger effort in the department to examine infrastructure demand in developing and transition 
countries, particularly focusing on price elasticity of nonresidential energy demand. Policy Research Working Papers are 
also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at aiimi@worldbank.org.  
But Albania and Macedonia are systematically found 
to have a relatively elastic demand for energy on the 
order of −0.7 to −0.8. In these countries, therefore, price 
adjustments would be one of the effective policy options 
to balance demand with supply during the period of 
energy crisis. In other countries, the demand response 
would be much weaker; pricing cannot be the only 
solution. Other policy measures, such as facilitation of 
firm energy efficiency and improvements in the quality of 
infrastructure services, may be required.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The world economy experienced several significant hikes in international energy prices since 
2000 until recently. The crude oil price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) exceeded 100 
U.S. dollars per barrel in February 2008. The wholesale electricity price (Phelix Day Base) at 
the European Energy Exchange also reached 100 euros per MWh in April 2008. A series of 
increases in energy prices revealed that South Eastern Europe (SEE) is one of the vulnerable 
regions to such external energy shocks. The recent suspension of international natural gas 
delivery from Russia caused mass power outages and mass heating failures in the Balkan 
states, such as Bulgaria and Macedonia. Hydro-dependent countries, such as Albania, will 
experience large-scale of load shedding if severe droughts happen.  
 
More recently, the region seems to be faced with another emerging challenge to adjust 
production in energy-intensive industries, such as cement, metal, paper and chemical 
manufacturing, which have been affected negatively by the sharp economic slowdown since 
2008. Two conflicting effects are predicted under the global economic crisis. Given the 
weakening demand for their products, on one hand, the industrial and commercial demand 
for energy would decrease. On the other hand, the demand may increase because of the 
decline in international energy prices.  
 
The current paper attempts to explore the possibility to infer the demand behavior of 
industrial energy users from the existing micro-data, Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Surveys. Because of various data limitations, the estimation results should be 
interpreted with caution, especially when drawing specific policy implications. This paper 
will focus on estimating the relationship between the prices and the demand using the micro-
level data in seven SEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia. It also casts light on the demand respond to shocks in the 
real economy. The paper focuses on the industrial or nonresidential demand for energy, 
because of its potential importance in setting the development strategy in the energy sector,   - 3 -
including pricing issues.
1 The estimated demand-price relationship can show how energy 
consumers, especially large-volume users, would respond to an external supply shock. What 
would happen if such a shock is transferred to energy end-users? Given some historical and 
institutional background in each country’s electricity sector, the paper discusses what policy 
option can be considered reliable to accommodate expected price changes. Based on the 
estimation results, the paper also casts light on how inefficient firms would be. The estimated 
technical (in)efficiency seems to vary significantly among countries even within the region.   
 
Under the Energy Community framework established in 2005,
2 the region has been working 
on various structural and economic issues in the energy sector. It generally aims at creating a 
stable regulatory and market structure to attract more investment, facilitate regional energy 
trade, and whence enhance security of energy supply in the region. The progress varies 
across member countries (e.g., IEA, 2008; EC, 2009). Despite the structural and market 
reforms, such as unbundling and private sector participation, inefficient pricing, unreliable 
supply, energy inefficiency in housing and appliances, and environmental concerns are 
considered among the most important challenges in the region.  
 
In this regard, the importance of understanding the demand for energy cannot be 
overemphasized. Note that it is not always easy to estimate with available data and there are 
a number of data and econometric issues that need to be taken into account. When designing 
and implementing any upward and downward price and/or supply adjustments, the price-
demand relationship, which is by and large represented by price elasticities, is most essential, 
though the current paper also addresses other issues, such as demand response to real shocks. 
The textbook theory of supply and demand tells us that when the supply condition of energy 
                                                 
1 From the data point of view, the current paper analyzes the demand for “energy,” including electricity and 
other fuels, because the used data cover both of them. However, many parts of the discussion will interpret the 
estimation results as electricity, because it is the major energy source in the SEE region. Still, note that this is 
merely an approximation and it is in fact one of the possible distortionary factors if our estimation results would 
be found counterintuitive in the region’s electricity sector. This does not mean that other energy sources are not 
important. In some Eastern Europe countries, such as Croatia and Romania, natural gas contributes to more than 
25 percent of total primary energy supply (e.g., IEA, 2008).  
2 It entered into force in July 2006.    - 4 -
changes for some exogenous reason, such as a sudden global tightness in oil or electricity and 
an unexpected shutdown of domestic power plants, the equilibrium would behave differently 
depending on price elasticity of demand. If the demand is elastic, a small change on the 
supply side would result in large adjustments in energy consumption. By contrast, if demand 
is relatively price-inelastic, there is little room for consumption to accommodate a given 
supply-side change. Instead, prices must be of necessity adjusted to a large extent. This is the 
basic reason why the Ramsey pricing calls for lower margins (or prices) for more elastic 
demanders in the price discrimination context.   
 
According to the traditional literature review, the price elasticity of “electricity” demand is 
estimated from –1.02 to –2.00 for residential users and from –1.25 to –1.94 for industrial 
consumers (Taylor, 1975). More recently, a meta-analysis by Espey and Espey (2004) shows 
that the average residential electricity price elasticity among earlier studies published 
between 1971 and 2000 is –0.35 in the short run and –0.85 over the long run. Bernstein and 
Griffin (2005), using U.S. state-level data, find that the residential electricity elasticities are –
0.24 and –0.32 in the short and long run, respectively. For commercial users, the short- and 
long-run price elasticities are estimated at –0.21 and –0.97, respectively. Noticeably, another 
recent work, which relies on the same U.S. data for a similar period of time but at the 
national aggregate level, indicates that the industrial demand elasticity may be rather smaller 
in absolute terms than other previous works (Kamerschen and Porter, 2004). It is shown that 
the residential electricity elasticity ranges between –0.85 and –0.94, while the industrial one 
varies from –0.34 to –0.55.  
 
As to “energy” demand in general, the price elasticity of manufacturing energy demand is 
estimated at –0.28 to –0.49 in the United States (Anderson, 1981). As per Pindyck and 
Rotemberg (1983), the elasticity can be different depending on firms’ dynamic investment 
behavior; the estimated elasticity of U.S. manufacturing is –0.36 in the short run, –0.58 in the 
medium run, and –0.99 in the long run. It is also shown that energy demand elasticities are 
different across industries (Denny et al., 1981). The short-run elasticity varies from –0.61 in 
the paper industry to nearly zero in the tobacco, metal fabricating, and machinery electrical   - 5 -
industries. The long-run energy elasticities are also different between industries, ranging 
between –0.01 to –0.73.  
 
The existing literature reveals two facts. First, industrial energy or electricity consumers tend 
to have greater price elasticity (in absolute terms) than residents. This is because households 
have few energy alternatives regardless of prices. They must use energy for their living. On 
the other hand, industrial energy users, such as manufacturers and hotels, can choose 
technology and save energy by introducing energy-efficient devices and machines if energy 
prices go up (i.e., energy-capital substation).
3 Therefore, the industrial price elasticity is 
normally higher over the medium to long run. From the policy point of view, this means that 
enterprises would be more responsive to the government pricing policy and the supply-side 
changes. Note that energy prices are still regulated in many countries. In addition, 
nonresidential demand usually accounts for 40–60 percent of total demand for energy in the 
SEE region.
4 Hence, in order to design the optimal pricing structure and govern energy 
demand and supply, the nonresidential demand cannot be underestimated.  
 
Second, in the literature, the estimated elasticities have a wide variation and seem to be 
difficult to compare with one another. Of course, the analyzed data are different and the 
estimation methods are also different. However, particularly for industrial demand, it seems 
difficult to find consistent evidence on price elasticities, as pointed out by Bohi and 
Zimmerman (1984). The range of estimates is too wide to agree on the norm. The wide 
variation is interpreted as a potential risk of over-generalizing our results, and it also means 
that industrial energy demand would be highly country- and location-specific and dependent 
on the system of production and technology in the economy. By contrast, it is fairly 
                                                 
3 Norsworthy and Harper (1981) show that the capital-energy elasticity of substitution is found largely positive 
in the U.S. manufacturing sector. The estimated complementarity can be understood to mean that the 
technology embodied in equipment is designed to consume, rather than save, energy. This is typically true in the 
U.S. history, because capital was introduced mainly for labor-saving purposes, rather than energy-saving.  
4 The analysis focuses on the industrial demand for energy and ignores the residential side, such as willingness-
to-pay analysis. If there is any information on the residential demand, needless to say, it should be incorporated 
into the policy consideration. It would expand available options to policymakers.    - 6 -
reasonable to assume that residential energy demand would be more or less the same in a 
certain region.  
 
The current paper concentrates on investigating the industrial demand for energy, partially 
because of data availability but mostly because it is expected to yield important policy 
implications for the SEE countries, where the supply of energy is not always secured and 
several energy-intensive industries agglomerate in the region to take advantage of cheaper 
energy inputs. The paper mainly uses firm-level data from the 2005 Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) and estimates the price elasticities of industrial 
energy demand.
5 Unlike some of the earlier literature (e.g., Kamerschen and Porter, 2004; 
Filippini and Hunt, 2009), the analysis focuses on investigating how individual enterprises 
would likely respond to any possible supply shock of energy. The firm behavior may differ 
across countries, from sector to sector and depending on individual firms. The paper also 
quantifies technical inefficiency in firm production by applying a stochastic frontier 
technique.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the importance of 
the price elasticity for energy in the real economy. Section III provides a brief overview of 
energy demand and supply in SEE countries. Section IV establishes an empirical model and 
describes our data uses. Section V summarizes the main estimation results, and Section VI 
discusses some policy implications.  
 
II. PRICE ELASTICITY FOR ENERGY AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
When implementing industrial and energy policies, policymakers should pay more attention 
to the industrial energy demand. There are two particularly important parameters when 
                                                 
5 The 2005 BEEPS data originally cover about 4,000 firms in 26 ECA countries (e.g., World Bank, 2007a). But 
the current paper relies on data for only seven SEE states.    - 7 -
analyzing demand side issues: (i) price elasticity of energy demand and (ii) conditional factor 
demand elasticity with respect to output.  
 
First, suppose that the capacity to supply energy is not sufficient enough to meet the potential 
demand, as in Albania and Macedonia. Then, any external adverse shock will easily translate 
into a considerable shift of the supply curve upward. With a highly elastic demand, for 
instance, greater than 0.5 in absolute terms, the domestic energy price can be kept at a 
reasonable level, because the shock would be absorbed largely by quantity adjustments. A 10 
percent increase in energy tariffs would reduce energy consumption by more than 5 percent. 
If energy demand is inelastic, for instance, less than 0.1 in absolute term, the economy will 
have to experience a sizable adjustment in energy prices. These are movements along the 
demand curve, as illustrated in Figure 1.
6  
 
It is a political decision whether or not to pass the high energy prices realized at the new 
equilibrium on to end-users. A significant increase in retail energy prices may not be 
acceptable for industrial and commercial users, let alone for residential customers 
(affordability issue).
7 In theory, the Ramsey pricing rule suggests that if governments (or 
operators) can discriminate energy prices among different customers, they should charge 
more to less elastic customers in order to maximize economic efficiency, because their 
demand is less likely to react to high tariffs. For price sensitive consumers, prices must be 
kept lower; otherwise, these consumers would reduce their consumption. Note that there is 
no consideration of equity or other economic factors, such as competitiveness, in the Ramsey 
                                                 
6 The figure is illustrative and may not depict the real situation. Particularly, the supply curve can vary 
depending on the supply structure of each country. It could be much steep but may be a vertical line because 
there are some elements that follow the market mechanisms in the international energy markets. In addition, 
although a certain pressure is surely created, the suggested movement may not necessarily take place because 
the domestic market is usually regulated.  
7 In the Europe and Central Asia (ECA) Region, a normal affordability ratio for the power sector may be 10 to 
15 percent of total household spending in case electricity is used for heating, cooking and hot water. If other 
fuels are used for these purposes, a threshold may be 10 percent (World Bank, 2006a).    - 8 -
rule. As already discussed in the economic literature,
8 the Ramsey pricing may not be 
compatible with the equity objective and may run the risk of reducing firm competitiveness 
and thereby economic growth. 
 
Figure 1. Price elasticity of energy demand and energy supply shocks  
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
Second, energy demand must of necessity depend on production levels. As experienced 
during the oil crisis of the 1970s, the decline in energy consumption would inevitably occur 
in response to stagnation in production, commerce and employment, unless there is sizable 
technical inefficiency in the economic system (e.g., Bohi and Powers, 1993).
9 This is a shift 
of the demand function (Figure 2). How much it would shift is dependent on demand 
parameters.  
 
                                                 
8 In general, there are two problems caused by price discrimination when a monopolist sets higher prices to 
inelastic customers. First, price discrimination may worsen the distribution of income even if it improves 
economic efficiency. Second, it may reduce efficiency if the risks of compounded output reducing effects are 
large (see, for example, Schmalensee (1981) and Sheehan (1991)).  
9 In fact, one may expect that there would be a mass of technical inefficiency in transition economies, 
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Figure 2. Energy demand shift conditional on output demand shocks    
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
If a new equilibrium price caused by some of these exogenous shocks is not allowed to take 
place for some reason, both direct and indirect costs would be imposed on the economy. 
First, if the price of retail energy is kept lower than the sustainable supply cost, governments 
need to subsidize the sector and fill in the gap between the retail and production prices either 
through direct subsidy to utilities or by hiding such costs somewhere off the budget. This is a 
direct cost of underpricing, which is one of the important factors of quasi-fiscal deficits in the 
public energy provision.
10 In either case, the lack of financial viability would threaten the 
sustainability of infrastructure development sooner or later. In some countries of the Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA) region, the quasi-fiscal deficit in the electricity sector is estimated to 
reach more than 10 percent of GDP (Table 1). In our sample, it was about 0.9 percent for 
Croatia, while it was estimated to exceed 4 percent of GDP for Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia 
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Table 1. Quasi-fiscal deficits in electricity sector (% of GDP)  
2000 2001 2002 2003
Albania 10.5 7.4 6.1 4.2
Armenia 1.4 2.2 1.0 1.0
Azerbaijan 11.4 10.1 8.1 6.4
Belarus 2.5 2.2 0.8 0.0
Bosnia 5.4 5.1 3.9 1.4
Bulgaria 9.5 8.1 7.0 3.8
Croatia 2.1 2.1 1.8 0.9
Georgia 12.2 6.9 6.5 6.0
Kazakhstan 3.3 2.9 2.4 1.3
Kyrgyz Rep.  18.6 25.2 19.0 9.2
Macedonia 5.0 3.6 3.5 5.6
Moldova 10.8 7.7 3.2 2.7
Poland 0.3 1.4 1.1 0.8
Romania 3.8 3.7 2.5 1.3
Russia 5.4 3.6 3.1 1.0
Serbia & Montenegro 22.5 16.5 8.9 8.7
Tajikistan 28.2 25.0 23.0 16.5
Turkey 1.8 2.1 1.1 0.6
Ukraine 9.1 6.8 5.6 4.0
Uzbekistan 8.6 10.2 13.1 12.1  
Source: World Bank (2006b).  
 
Second, an indirect cost of underpricing is inefficient resource allocation in the economy. 
Underpricing must of necessity induce users to over-consume energy and act as a 
disincentive to improving energy efficiency because firms are likely to keep using old 
equipment and machinery, rather than investing in costly energy efficient technologies. 
Overconsumption would in turn deteriorate the financial viability problem, making it more 
difficult to maintain the quality of utility services.  
 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE  
 
Supply  
The supply capacity of electricity varies markedly across SEE countries, as partly 
documented by IEA (2008). In terms of installed capacity per capita, Albania has only one-
third as much generation capacity as more advanced countries in Europe (Figure 3). Croatia 
and Macedonia are also potentially deficient in domestic electricity supply capacity. 
Apparently, these inadequacies can threaten domestic energy supply and trigger off massive 
load shedding, when an external energy shock occurs. The vulnerability may increase 
particularly when countries are largely dependent on hydrology for energy. In Albania, for 
instance, three hydropower plants account for over 90 percent of domestic electricity   - 11 -
production (Figure 4).
11 Consequently, in drought years the country had to import 500 to 
2,000 GWh of energy or 10 to 50 percent of total power consumption at unfavorable 
international prices, with approximately 10 percent of demand still left unmet.  
 














































































































































































Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), Energy Information Administration database and IPA (2009).  
 







































































































































































Sources: WDI, Energy Information Administration database and IPA (2009).  
 
Demand  
From the industrial demand point of view, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia seem to be 
energy-intensive economies. In general, energy demand increases proportionally with 
economic development, but how much energy is required to produce one unit of output—
                                                 
11 For instance, see Fida et al. (2009).    - 12 -
which is referred to as energy intensity—varies among countries. It depends on the economic 
and industrial structure. High energy intensity of the economy results from inefficient 
consumption by not only industries but also households and heating load of the building 
sector. Serbia is estimated to use three times more electricity than more developed 
neighboring countries (Figure 5). Bulgaria and Macedonia also seem to be using electricity 
quite intensively. Croatia is the least energy-intensive economy in the SEE region; only 0.66 
kWh is required to produce $1 of GDP. The ECA average (only low- and middle-income 
countries) is about 2 kWh per GDP.  
 
The observed difference in energy intensity is also partly attributed to the difference in the 
economy’s production and export structure. In particular in the SEE region, several energy-
intensive industries are located, such as cement and copper in Albania, steel and zinc- and 
copper-based metallurgical production in Bulgaria, metal-processing in Macedonia, and 
aluminum in Montenegro. These industries were often established for political reasons during 
the Soviet era, and their facilities tend to be out of date and inefficient. Still, they are often 
playing an important role in production and exports of the economy. Macedonia’s non-metal 
minerals, iron and steel products account for 18 percent of total exports (Figure 6).
12  
 












































































































































































1/ 2003 for Serbia.
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on WDI and IAEA Energy and Environment Data Reference Bank.  
 
                                                 
12 These export items are classified under the SITC Code 66 non-metal mineral, and 67 iron and steel.    - 13 -








































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation based on WDI and WITS COMTRADE Database.  
 
On the micro level, our enterprise data, in which “energy” covers not only electricity but also 
other fuel, show that Bulgarian companies are using energy most intensively. There are 
certain similarities to the above figures, but not completely. The average share of energy 
spending in total costs is about 9 percent in Bulgaria, which is followed by 8.6 percent of 
Romania and 7.6 percent of Albania (Figure 7). Of particular note, there is a large variation 
in energy intensity across firms even in a country. Some companies in Bulgaria are spending 
more than 60 percent of total costs on energy. They are considered especially energy-
intensive enterprises. On the other hand, there are a number of firms that expend less than 10 
percent on energy of their total costs. This firm-level heterogeneity is an important fact for 
designing micro-data analysis like the current paper.  
 













































































































































Source: Author’s calculation based on BEEP data.    - 14 -
 
Prices and deficits  
Given the tight supply positions to meet the growing demand, all the SEE countries have 
rapidly increased electricity tariffs in recent years. Albania and Bulgaria nearly tripled 
nonresidential electricity prices between 2000 and 2009 (Figure 8). Croatia and Romania 
have relatively high rates in the region. Macedonia has also adjusted the nonresidential price 
quickly in recent years. The nonresidential electricity prices exceed 10 U.S. cents per kWh in 
all SEE countries but Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This level of price is almost 
equivalent to or even higher than the world-highest “industrial” electricity prices in OECD 




Compared with residential tariffs, many countries have proceeded with rebalancing between 
residential and industrial electricity prices, in favor of nonresidential customers. The relative 
nonresidential price to residential tariff declined from 1.2–1.6 to nearly or less than one 
(Figure 9). Romania is keeping nonresidential tariffs relatively low, compared with those for 
residential consumers. Particularly, some eligible industrial consumers are enjoying 
discounted prices. From the utility point of view, in fact, the cost of transmitting electricity to 
large-volume consumers with a higher voltage could be cheaper than low-voltage power 
supply. High voltage can reduce transmission losses. In addition, the cost of electrical 
transformers may not be required, because large-volume users may use high-voltage energy 
as it is. Otherwise, they may be equipped with private transformers in their factories or 
buildings. In Macedonia, the relative nonresidential price increased substantially, but the 
general level of electricity prices may remain relatively low for both residential and 
nonresidential customers.  
 
                                                 
13 According to IEA database, the average industrial electricity price in OECD member countries in Europe was 
estimated at 11.6 U.S. cents per kWh in 2007, which was twice as high as the average in 2002, i.e., 5.9 cents.    - 15 -
The main reason the countries have increasingly adjusted their domestic prices is that 
electricity production costs increased significantly due to high international commodity 
prices of coal, oil and natural gas and soaring import prices of electricity. One of the major 
energy markets in Europe, European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Germany, has exhibited 
considerable increases in electricity prices since 2000 (Figure 10). The average baseload spot 
price exceeded 60 euros in 2006, and after some fluctuation, reached 70 euros in 2008. The 
Balkan states have to pay some additional transmission fees to this, which varies from 
several to 15 euros reflecting the available transmission capacity and its market prices.
14  
 

































































































































1/ 2006 for Serbia.
 
















                                                 
14 For instance, because of the transmission bottleneck between Albania and Montenegro, the transmission 
capacity right between Podgorica and Albania at the Montenegrian power system was priced at as high as 8 to 
9 euros per MW with a maximum of 15 euros in 2007.    - 16 -
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1/ 2006 for Serbia.  
Source: ERRA database.  
 




























































































































































Through continued government efforts to rationalize energy prices at the retail level, the 
deficits of the electricity sector were largely removed in the early 2000s, though not 
eliminated completely (Figure 11). Although no comparable estimates are available after 
2003, some countries seem to have continued passing high international energy prices to end 
users to a certain extent, meaning that the quasi-fiscal deficits might have declined further. 
As shown in Figure 8, Bulgaria and Macedonia increased electricity prices aggressively since 
around 2004. However, these may be a partial translation. Recall that the market electricity   - 17 -
price at the EEX doubled during the past three years.
15 Albania is modestly adjusting 
domestic electricity prices in recent years, though the existing price may already be high with 
the country’s income level taken into account.  
 
The implemented price adjustments seem to have successfully motivated consumers to use 
electricity more wisely than before, but perhaps the response may not be sufficient. Per capita 
consumption of electricity in SEE countries continues increasing and remains at high levels 
by global standards (Figure 12). The figure does not mean that there was no effect of price 
adjustments; rather, it implies that the demand for energy or electricity may continue to be 
strong in this region for other reasons, for instance, the region’s relatively robust economic 
growth (until recently).
16 This reminds us of the difficulty in governing the demand for 
energy, while balancing various policy objectives, including energy security, economic 
growth and fiscal consolidation.  
 

























































































































































Source: World Bank (2006b).  
 
 
                                                 
15 There is normally a time lag between an increase in market prices and the associated administered price 
adjustment. Moreover, high international energy prices should only partially translate into domestic retail 
prices, when some fraction of the domestic energy is purchased from abroad.  
16 In addition, this figure includes the residential demand for electricity, which is considered less price-elastic 
and expected to increase along with economic development.    - 18 -





































































































Source: Author’s calculation based on WDI and IAEA Energy and Environment Data Reference Bank.  
 
Quality of services  
Finally, one remaining important characteristic of the SEE countries is the poor quality of 
public electricity services. This will complicate the sector’s financial problem, as in many 
other transition economies. While tariff adjustments are difficult to justify in the absence of 
reliable power supply, the quality of services cannot be improved without tariff increases. It 
is worth noting that unlike residential customers, industrial energy users can always choose 
to install their own captive generators if they are not satisfied with the quality and price of 
publicly provided energy. In the SEE region, in fact, several large-volume energy consumers, 
such as a new cement factory in Albania, do not rely on public utilities for energy.  
 
From the empirical perspective, it is generally difficult to measure the quality of public 
infrastructure. The BEEPS asks individual firms various questions about the quality of 
infrastructure, such as annual frequency and daily duration of service suspensions. Hence, the 
information is available on how many days a firm experienced power outages last year. The 
answer ranges from zero to 365 days. The information is also available on how many hours 
are required to restore the electricity supply if it is interrupted. It ranges from zero to 24 
hours.  
   - 19 -
By regional comparison, the ECA countries in general have had relatively good quality of 
infrastructure services, similar to the East Asia and Pacific region. The simple average 
frequency of electricity outages in ECA was less than 10 days per year in 2004. However, 
this does not mean that all the countries in the ECA region would have overcome the quality 
problems in utility services. First, some enterprises in the region may continue suffering from 
long-lasting service interruptions. The average duration required for electricity service 
recovery is estimated at 5.3 hours in ECA.  
 
Second, there are wide variations in infrastructure quality among ECA countries (Figure 13). 
Albania has the poorest quality of electricity infrastructure services; the number of days 
without sufficient electricity exceeded 200 days.
17 It is followed by Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Serbia and Montenegro in the SEE region.  
 
Third, it is noticeable that not all enterprises in Albania are equally suffering infrastructure 
difficulties, and that there are also a number of firms operating under harsh infrastructure 
conditions in other countries. Some firms in Bulgaria experienced continuous power outages 
every day.
18 Several companies in Macedonia also claimed that electricity interruptions 
occurred more than 200 days a year, which is at the same frequency as in Albania. 
Importantly, the quality of utility services is also changing over time. When compared the 
2002 and 2005 BEEPS results, most countries, except Albania, succeeded in improving the 
quality of utility services. For instance, Azerbaijan achieved the most spectacular 
improvement in this area for recent years; by investing a lot of public resources in power 
stations, the country succeeded in restoring a nearly 24-hour electricity supply.  
 
                                                 
17 One might consider Albania to be an outlier, possibly creating statistical noise in data, when pooling its 
observations. The following empirical analysis will account for this fact and show that the main estimation 
results are robust regardless of whether the country is included or not.  
18 Note that in the BEEPS, the infrastructure quality data were collected in the way that the interview had been 
conducted to firm managers. Therefore, they are not subjective views but may reflect some approximations 
made by managers. However, all the indications are that in each country there is a significant variation from 
company to company in the level of infrastructure service quality they received.    - 20 -
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Source: BEEPS 2005.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODELS AND DATA  
 
The following simple cost function is considered:  ) ; , ( A Y W F C   where W and Y represent 
input prices and outputs, respectively. A is a productivity or fixed cost parameter, which is 
assumed to be affected by the quality of public infrastructure and other unobserved factors.
19 
Based on the traditional industrial organization literature (e.g., Nerlove, 1963; Christensen 
and Greene, 1976; Fuss, 1977), a variant of the translog cost function is examined:  
 
 
   
    
 
   
    

   
 
ik i k Z W
k k YZ kh h k Z Z k k Z i i YW
ij j i W W i i W YY Y
W Z
Y Z Z Z Z W Y
W W W Y Y C
k i


















where C denotes the amount of total operating cost, Y is an output proxy, and  i W  is the ith 
input price.  k Z  represents the kth measure of infrastructure quality.  
                                                 
19 This potentially includes a variety of institutional and structural unobservables, which constitute a statistical 
error in the model.    - 21 -
 
Three inputs are considered: labor, energy and the rest of the costs. Conceptually, the last can 
be referred to as capital or equipment. Thus, denote    K E L j i , , ,   in Equation (1). Unit 
labor price WL is obtained by dividing total wage expenses by the number of employees. 
Energy price WE is calculated by dividing energy and fuel expenses by the amount of assets, 
more precisely total asset replacement costs; there is no information on the actual amounts of 
electricity and fuel consumption in our data.
20 Finally, “capital” potentially consists of 
various costs, and the unit price of input capital (WK) is computed by dividing the operating 
expenses other than labor and energy costs by the total asset replacement costs.
21  
 
Output is measured by total sales in U.S. dollars, because no physical output variable that is 
common across companies is available in the database. Since firms in the sample engage in 
various businesses, this is only the usable common proxy for outputs. To control for sector 
heterogeneity, the empirical model incorporates the sector-specific dummy variables.  
 
Two variables are used for infrastructure service quality: the number of days with power 
outages (in days per year) and the average duration required to restore an interrupted 
electricity service (in hours per day), denoted by  1 P Z , and  2 P Z , respectively. In our data, 
these are the most objective measurements to represent the quality of infrastructure services 
that each enterprise receives.
22  
 
                                                 
20 Some approximation is often necessary (e.g., Sickles et al, 1986;Filippini et al., 2008). An underlying 
rationale of our variables is that the amount of energy consumed would be relevant to the amount of machinery, 
equipment, or more generally, assets owned by each firm. In addition, it is noteworthy that this imputed energy 
price varies across firms by construction. It is not any single unit price of electricity or gas that is often applied 
to a certain group of firms in a particular area. Rather, this variable reflects not only various pubic energy prices 
but also the cost of having private backup generators and other energy alternatives. Notably, however, the major 
energy source for firms is electricity in the SEE region, as mentioned above. 
21 Some of the implied prices are statistically considered outliers; but the estimation results have been found 
broadly robust regardless of whether or not to include those outliers, as will be seen below. 
22 They are not subjective assessment by firms, but to a certain extent the variables may reflect some subjective 
judgment by respondents in the surveys. The variables can be misreported and biased. But the country-specific 
fixed-effect models are expected to mitigate these data problems.   - 22 -
There are three empirical remarks on the Z’s. First, the BEEPS database provides other 
measurements of public utility services in the water supply and telecommunications sectors. 
It is technically possible to incorporate those variables in our model. However, it has been 
found that the quality of water and telecommunications services would weakly affect firm 
production (Iimi, 2009); thus, the current paper adopts the electricity-related variables for Z.  
 
Second, in Equation (1), Z’s are specified as the composite cost function rather than the 
simple translog cost function (e.g., Kwoka, 2002). This aims at accommodating zero-quality 
values, i.e., no interruption of service delivery. In such a case, the number of days with 
service interruptions is zero. It follows, as a logical consequence, that the duration required to 
restore the service is zero hours. In our sample, a considerable portion of the observations 
have zero values for  k Z . A popular approach to this problem may be to replace zeros with a 
small positive value. However, this may cause severe bias in the estimates. Weninger (2003) 
shows that the Composite approach and Zero-output translog cost function have relatively 
low bias and the small standard deviation of the estimates. The small value and generalized 
translog cost function methods are largely biased.
23  
 
In the current context, the composite approach has several advantages relative to other 
alternatives. It is expected to be less biased, as mentioned. It also preserves the linear 
homogeneity property in input prices, even after incorporating the quadratic form for quality 
measures.
24 Moreover, the Composite approach is computationally tractable and relatively 
easy to achieve convergence in the maximum likelihood estimator.
25  
 
                                                 
23 With our data, it is also found that the small value translog cost estimator tends to sensitive to the choice of a 
small value.  
24 The absence of the linear homogeneity is considered the principle limitation of this approach when it is 
applied to a multi-product cost function (Baumol et al., 1982; Kwoka, 2002). Fortunately, this is not the case in 
the current framework.  
25 The current paper partly relies on the stochastic-frontier model, which is a maximum likelihood estimator.    - 23 -
The third remark on the Z’s is about their interpretation. Recall that Equation (1) explicitly 
includes the cost of presumably measurable consumption of energy and fuel. Therefore, the 
direct effect of reduced energy consumption due to outages is supposed to be captured by 
other variables than Z’s. Our quality variables Z in principle represent more implicit costs of 
poor quality services. For example, operatives in a factory may have to wait for electricity 
restoration without doing anything, when a power outage unexpectedly happens. Still, firms 
have to pay their normal wages. If power outages damage product quality, this loss will also 
be captured by Z’s. To avoid a possible negative impact of suspended power services, 
enterprises may have to invest in their own private backup systems. This will create another 
type of implicit cost of poor quality infrastructure.  
 
To estimate Equation (1), two estimation techniques are employed: seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) and stochastic-frontier analysis (SFA). To have a well-behaved cost 
function, the following symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed:  
 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , ,            i Z W i YW ijW W i W Z Z Z Z W W W W k i i j i i k h h k i j j i          (2) 
 
For the SUR model, in addition, the following factor share equations are obtained from 
Shephard’s lemma:  
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where Si is the cost share of input i. Through the SUR model, the cost parameters are 
estimated in Equation (1) and two of the factor share equations (3).
26 An advantage of the 
SUR is that higher efficiency in estimation is expected without wasting the degree of 
freedom (Christensen and Greene, 1976). A disadvantage may be that a strict cost 
                                                 
26 One of the factor equations should be dropped to avoid the singularity problem.    - 24 -
minimization proposition must be imposed (Kwoka, 2002). By construction, the SUR model 
assumes allocative and technical efficiencies; any deviation from the frontier is captured by 
statistical errors, and thus it cannot control for technical inefficiency in an explicit manner 
(e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997). This may raise certain concern in the present context, 
because it is less likely that enterprises in transition economies are strictly following the cost 
minimization proposition.  
 
In order to directly incorporate the possible technical inefficiency, the paper also applies the 
stochastic-frontier model, in which the assumptions of allocative and technical efficiency are 
not imposed and firm costs are allowed to deviate from the efficient frontier due to some 
unknown factors, X-inefficiency (e.g., Coelli, 1992; Berger and Mester, 1997). In the SFA, 
the error term is composed of two parts: a non-negative technical inefficiency, u and an 
idiosyncratic error term, v. The error term in Equation (1) is defined as: 
 
v u ln ln     (4) 
 
where  u ln  is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a 
half normal distribution  ) , 0 ( u N  , and  v ln  is i.i.d. according to a standard normal 
distribution ) , 0 ( v N  .  
 
Given our initial motivation of the paper, the following point estimates are investigated under 
the above framework. First, the price elasticities of demand for factors of production are 
calculated from the conventional Allen’s partial elasticities of substitution. The elasticity 
between inputs i and j is denoted by  ij   and given by this (e.g., Uzawa, 1962; Berndt and 
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Then, the price elasticity of demand for factor i associated with price j is:  
 
ij j ij S     (6) 
 
Of particular interest is the implied own price elasticity of energy demand:  
 
E E E E W W EE S S S S
E E / ) (       (7) 
 
Second, the conditional factor demand elasticity with respect to output is calculated. This 
aims to address the question of how the industrial energy demand would respond to a global 
economic slowdown, as experienced currently. Given the cost function Equation (1) and 
Shephard’s lemma, the conditional demand elasticity for factor i with respect to output y is 
written by:  
 
 ) ln ( ) / (
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  (8) 
 
where Xi denotes the derived conditional demand for factor i given output Y. It is clear that 
the conditional factor demand elasticity is dependent on four factors: unit cost (i.e., C/Y), 
factor price level, factor share in total costs, and the output elasticity of total costs. If unit 
cost is high, it means production is input-intensive. Thus, the elasticity tends to be high 
holding everything constant. Similarly, the elasticity increases with the factor share Si. If the 
factor price is high, the elasticity will be small because of the possible substitution effect 
between factors. Finally, if the whole cost is elastic to output, then the factor demand 
elasticity is also sensitive to the level of output. The more output, the more cost. Therefore, 
more inputs are required.   
 
In addition to these two main issues in question, two more estimates are inferred: cost 
elasticity with respect to factor price and technical (in)efficiency. Apparently, the former   - 26 -
must of necessity be related to the factor share equation (3). By Shephard’s lemma, the 
predicted share equation can be used to assess how the total cost would respond to a change 
in factor prices. This is of particular interest from the country’s economic competitiveness 
perspective. Any price change will have a cost implication for firms. Given an exogenous 
shock on energy prices, the economy may lose its competitiveness if increased energy prices 
increase firms’ operating costs significantly. Conversely, if the cost elasticity with respect to 
energy prices is small, the economy would be less vulnerable to exogenous energy shocks.  
 
Finally, the paper will pay attention to the degree of technical (in)efficiency, which is 
computed as the difference between the linear prediction of cost and the possible frontier. 
One advantage of pooling micro data from different countries is that the relative technical 
inefficiency of each country can be inferred from the estimated function. The estimated 
technical inefficiency in cost terms is defined by:  
 
 ) | exp(ln  u E u   (9) 
 
This allows us to measure to what extent each firm’s production would involve technical 
inefficiency, which may include energy inefficiency. The following analysis calculates  C u/  
as a primary technical inefficiency index.  
 
The used data come from the 2005 BEEPS for 7 countries in the SEE region. The sample size 
amounts to about 1,000. This excludes a number of observations of which the relevant cost 
data are not available.
27 The number of observations per country in our sample varies from 
79 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 269 in Romania, but mostly around 150.  
                                                 
27 The original sample size of the BEEPS covering the seven countries is 2,040. Although the data selection is 
merely dependent on data availability and thus considered fairly automatic, one might be concerned that there 
might be the self-selection mechanism where the data availability would be correlated with certain cost 
characteristics of firms. This is hardly testable by nature, but one possible indication could be the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, which hypothesizes the sampled and non-sampled observations would be drawn from the same 
population distribution. There are a number of observations in our data, for which C is available but other data 
items are missing so that they are not used for the analysis. The Wilcoxon test statistic varies across countries; 
(continued)   - 27 -
 
The summary statistics are shown in Table 2. Firms look different in size as well as factor 
intensity. The operating cost ranges from 10,000 to 423 million U.S. dollars with a mean of 
about 3.9 million U.S. dollars. The average wage is estimated at around US$ 5,400 per 
annum. In the sample the labor cost amounts to 22 percent of total costs on average. 
However, the degree of labor intensity varies considerably from nearly zero to 81 percent. 
The energy cost share also differs between nil to 66 percent with an average of about 
8 percent. The number of days without sufficient electricity supply reaches 28 days per year 
on average. The average duration needed for power restoration is about 2 hours. But these 
levels of public electricity services are markedly different from country to country and across 
regions within each country. Table 3 shows simple correlations between these variables.  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
C Operating cost  990 3,875 17,891 10 423,860
Y Output (total sales) 990 4,468 20,407 15 469,362
WL Wage (average per full time employee) 990 5.39 4.43 0.33 81.13
WE Energy and fuel price 990 0.73 2.74 0.00 67.00
WK Capital price 990 11.21 63.61 0.02 1841.00
S L Cost share of labor expenses (0 to 1) 990 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.81
S E Cost share of energy and fuel expenses (0 to  990 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.66
Z P1 Days without electricity supply a year 990 28.44 82.73 0.00 365.00
Z P2 Duration of  electricity suspension in hours 990 1.99 3.38 0.00 24.00
Sector dummy
Mining 990 0.02 0.13 0 1
Construction 990 0.09 0.29 0 1
Manufacturing 990 0.41 0.49 0 1
Transport 990 0.07 0.26 0 1
Trade 990 0.23 0.42 0 1
Real estate 990 0.07 0.25 0 1
Hotels and restaurant 990 0.07 0.25 0 1
Other services 990 0.05 0.21 0 1










                                                                                                                                                       
the hypothesis cannot be rejected in all the countries but Bulgaria and Romania. For further data sampling 
issues, see World Bank (2007a).    - 28 -
Table 3. Correlation  
CY W E WL WK Z P1 ZP2 S L
Y 0.998
WL 0.123 0.120
WE -0.014 -0.014 -0.002
WK 0.023 0.024 0.018 0.880
ZP1 0.017 0.025 -0.033 -0.006 -0.009
ZP2 -0.001 0.002 -0.013 -0.024 -0.008 0.183
S L -0.099 -0.099 0.171 -0.046 -0.102 0.052 -0.025
S E -0.091 -0.092 -0.064 0.156 -0.072 0.000 -0.016 0.101  
 
V. MAIN ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
Both SUR and SFA models are estimated with data from seven SEE countries; the results are 
shown in Table 4.
28 The coefficients are broadly consistent with economic theory; recall that 
the current paper relies on a simple firm cost minimization model and assumes that a certain 
group of firms would share the same cost function. The coefficient of output Y is positive and 
significant, and the operating cost increases with unit labor costs (wages) as well as energy 
and fuel expenditures. The coefficients are not dramatically different between the two 
models, though the statistical significance may change for some of the coefficients.  
 
Price elasticities of factor demand  
Given the estimated cost parameters, the own price elasticities of demand for production 
factors are evaluated at the sample means by the delta method (Equation (6)). All the own 
price elasticities are found significantly negative and consistent with economic theory 
(Table 5). The price elasticity of industrial energy demand in question is estimated at –0.403 
by the SUR regression and –0.366 by the SFA model. Therefore, on average, one can expect 
that a 10-percent increase in energy prices would reduce the industrial demand for energy by 
about 4 percent. These estimates are within the conventional range supported by the existing 
literature (e.g., Taylor, 1975; Bernstein and Griffin, 2005), and seem to be relatively 
inelastic, though not extraordinarily.  
                                                 
28 The results have been found indifferent about whether or not to include country-specific fixed effects. In 
addition, it has also been found robust against the clustering of errors by country and sector. Therefore, the 
following discussion will mainly present the unclustered estimation results without the country fixed effects.   - 29 -
 
Table 4. Estimated cost function with data from 7 SEE countries  
βY 0.866 (0.025) *** 0.859 (0.027) *** 0.858 (0.031) *** 0.859 (0.031) *** 0.858 (0.037) *** 0.867 (0.014) ***
βYY 0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
βWL 0.611 (0.015) *** 0.830 (0.022) *** 0.816 (0.032) *** 0.830 (0.032) *** 0.816 (0.061) *** 0.834 (0.034) ***
βWE 0.091 (0.017) *** –0.047 (0.030) –0.042 (0.060) –0.047 (0.055) –0.042 (0.131) –0.053 (0.073)
βWL WL –0.007 (0.006) –0.130 (0.014) *** –0.135 (0.021) *** –0.130 (0.021) *** –0.135 (0.020) *** –0.126 (0.018) ***
βWL WE 0.132 (0.003) *** 0.202 (0.007) *** 0.225 (0.010) *** 0.202 (0.010) *** 0.225 (0.011) *** 0.203 (0.009) ***
βWL WK –0.136 (0.003) *** –0.147 (0.008) *** –0.165 (0.012) *** –0.147 (0.012) *** –0.165 (0.015) *** –0.149 (0.010) ***
βWE WE 0.070 (0.004) *** 0.049 (0.009) *** 0.048 (0.016) *** 0.049 (0.015) *** 0.048 (0.015) *** 0.047 (0.013) ***
βWE WK 0.010 (0.004) *** 0.016 (0.008) * 0.018 (0.013) 0.016 (0.012) 0.018 (0.008) ** 0.017 (0.011)
βYWL 0.004 (0.002) * 0.009 (0.003) *** 0.010 (0.003) *** 0.009 (0.003) *** 0.010 (0.005) ** 0.009 (0.003) ***
βYWE –0.019 (0.002) *** –0.030 (0.005) *** –0.035 (0.007) *** –0.030 (0.006) *** –0.035 (0.013) *** –0.029 (0.007) ***
βZ P 1 0.001 (0.001) –0.000 (0.001) –0.001 (0.001) –0.000 (0.001) –0.001 (0.001) –0.000 (0.001)
βZ P 2 0.014 (0.008) * 0.011 (0.009) 0.018 (0.009) * 0.011 (0.008) 0.018 (0.009) ** 0.010 (0.005) **
βZ P 1Z P 1 –1.4E-6 (2.4E-6) 4.8E-7 (2.9E-6) 1.2E-6 (2.0E-6) 4.8E-7 (2.6E-6) 1.2E-6 (1.4E-6) 5.4E-7 (1.5E-6)
βZ P 1Z P 2 –3.6E-5 (4.0E-5) 6.4E-6 (4.3E-5) 4.0E-6 (2.7E-5) 6.4E-6 (2.8E-5) 4.0E-6 (1.3E-5) 7.0E-6 (4.3E-5)
βZ P 2Z P 2 4.3E-4 (5.0E-4) 4.7E-4 (5.2E-4) 2.7E-4 (4.1E-4) 4.7E-4 (3.9E-4) 2.7E-4 (3.9E-4) 4.9E-4 (3.1E-4)
βYZP 1 –8.5E-6 (5.9E-5) 2.1E-5 (6.7E-5) 3.2E-5 (4.4E-5) 2.1E-5 (4.9E-5) 3.2E-5 (3.9E-5) 2.1E-5 (4.1E-5)
βYZP 2 –3.5E-4 (1.0E-3) 1.2E-3 (1.2E-3) 1.2E-3 (1.0E-3) 1.2E-3 (9.6E-4) 1.2E-3 (9.6E-4) 1.0E-3 (7.5E-4)
βWL Z P 1 7.0E-5 (4.5E-5) 7.9E-5 (6.3E-5) 1.2E-4 (5.1E-5) ** 7.9E-5 (5.4E-5) 1.2E-4 (4.8E-5) ** 6.6E-5 (5.4E-5)
βWL Z P 2 –1.1E-3 (9.8E-4) –2.2E-3 (1.3E-3) * –2.1E-3 (1.2E-3) * –2.2E-3 (1.1E-3) ** –2.1E-3 (7.3E-4) *** –2.0E-3 (6.3E-4) ***
βWE Z P 1 9.5E-6 (5.4E-5) –1.5E-5 (1.2E-4) –6.3E-5 (1.2E-4) –1.5E-5 (1.1E-4) –6.3E-5 (1.6E-4) –1.3E-5 (1.2E-4)
βWE Z P 2 2.8E-3 (1.3E-3) ** 6.9E-3 (2.7E-3) ** 8.2E-3 (3.7E-3) ** 6.9E-3 (3.3E-3) ** 8.2E-3 (2.7E-3) *** 6.2E-3 (2.0E-3) ***
Construction 0.028 (0.060) 0.026 (0.063) 0.047 (0.054) 0.026 (0.051) 0.047 (0.043)
Manufacturing 0.081 (0.056) 0.069 (0.060) 0.105 (0.049) ** 0.069 (0.047) 0.105 (0.042) **
Transport –0.045 (0.061) 0.061 (0.065) 0.089 (0.063) 0.061 (0.059) 0.089 (0.045) **
Trade 0.021 (0.058) 0.057 (0.061) 0.076 (0.051) 0.057 (0.048) 0.076 (0.038) **
Real estate –0.071 (0.062) –0.062 (0.066) –0.034 (0.059) –0.062 (0.056) –0.034 (0.044)
Restaurant & hotel 0.005 (0.062) 0.027 (0.065) 0.038 (0.061) 0.027 (0.057) 0.038 (0.047)
Other services –0.046 (0.065) 0.007 (0.069) 0.020 (0.065) 0.007 (0.061) 0.020 (0.061)
Constant –0.355 (0.109) *** –0.751 (0.118) *** –0.521 (0.164) *** –0.752 (0.165) *** –0.521 (0.368) –0.742 (0.145) ***
Obs. 990 990 990 990 990 990
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes No No
Chi-square
   Cost equation 84577.2 85290.3 97692.7 107266
   Wage share equation 2388.6 2330.2





All countries All countries




All countries All countries All countries
 
 
Table 5. Price elasticity of demand for production factor  


















(0.012) (0.030) (0.013) (0.032)
Excluding Albania All countries
The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent the 10%, 5% and 1% level significance, respectively.   
 
One potential concern may be that the estimation results might be sensitive to outliers, 
especially in the implied factor prices. With the observations beyond the conventional upper   - 30 -
outer fence excluded, the same models are estimated.
29 The price elasticity of energy demand 
is estimated at –0.252 with a standard error of 0.032 in the SUR specification. This appears 
slightly lower than the previous estimate with outliers included but remains statistically 
significant and within the conventional range in the literature.  
 
One may also be concerned that pooling data from Albania, in which the quality of electricity 
services was extremely bad in the sample period, would create significant statistical noise in 
our case. Recall that the country experienced massive power outages around the sample year. 
With 118 observations from Albania discarded, the price elasticity is estimated under the 
same framework; the result has been found mostly unchanged, regardless of whether 
Albania’s data are included or not (Table 5).
30 The energy elasticity may be slightly lower 
than before. This implies that a large variation in the public energy supply conditions in 
Albania might play a certain role in exaggerating the measured demand response in other 
countries.  
 
For the same reason, one may think that different countries would have different economic 
structures and thus respond to a possible change in energy prices differently. One empirical 
approach to address this problem is to estimate the model separately for each country and 
evaluate the price elasticities within its own country data. A great advantage of this separate 
strategy is that the cost structure is no longer assumed the same among countries.
31 
Moreover, the estimates are independent of any country-specific fixed unobservables, which 
could potentially generate the omitted variable bias in the pooled model. On the other hand, 
one of the significant disadvantages of the separate estimation approach is obviously the 
relatively small sizes of country subsamples. In particular in our specification, there are a 
                                                 
29 The upper outer fences are estimated at 19.75 for WL, 1.06 for WE, and 15.14 for WK, respectively. In total, 
195 observations are excluded from the sample, leaving 797 observations as non-outliers.  
30 The estimated cost function is presented in Appendix Table A1.  
31 An alternative may be to evaluate the pooled model at each country’s sample means. However, it mans that 
the cost structure is still assumed to be the same across countries. It may be a relatively strong assumption to 
impose the same cost structure on all countries.    - 31 -
relatively large number of parameters to be estimated, compared with the number of 




The price elasticities estimated by the SFA technique tend to be larger than the SUR 
estimates, but some of the implied elasticities have lost statistical significance. In cases 
where both models are significant, the elasticity for Macedonia is about –1.0, instead of        
–0.76. For Serbia, the SFA provides an elasticity of –0.89, instead of –0.37. When comparing 
the price elasticities of demand for energy according to the SUR results, Albania and 
Macedonia are estimated to have the particularly elastic demand for energy; the elasticities 
are –0.77 and –0.76, respectively (Table 6).
33 For other countries, the price elasticities are 
relatively low in absolute terms at 0.2 to 0.4. The lowest elasticity is estimated at –0.21 for 
Romania (Figure 14). This may reflect the fact that the country’s economic structure still 
involves the large energy-intensive, unrestructured public sector.  
 
Table 6. Price elasticity of demand for production factor by country  
Bosnia & Herzegovin







































(0.030) (0.030) (0.070) (0.040) (0.060) (0.020) (0.060) (0.050) (0.100) (0.020) (0.050) (0.023) (0.044)
Albania Bulgaria
The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% level significance, respectively. 
Croatia Macedonia Romania Serbia
 
 
The significant difference may indicate that the effectiveness of price adjustments to balance 
demand and supply would be different from country to country. Bearing in mind a variety of 
assumptions and restrictions imposed on our empirical models, this can be interpreted to 
mean that even though the same price policy is implemented, in some countries, such as 
Albania and Macedonia, it would be a powerful tool, but in other countries, it may not be 
effective enough. Note that this is an estimation result, given the currently available data; 
                                                 
32 In the case of Albania, in fact, the SFA model does not converge successfully. 
33 The estimated cost functions are presented in Appendix Tables A2 to A8.    - 32 -
with more detailed data, the estimates could be refined further. The difference may result 
from different industrial structures among countries. As discussed below, the price elasticity 
differs across industries. The difference in elasticities may also reflect each economy’s 
tendency toward new energy-efficient technology. Some countries may have better access to 
advanced knowledge, and others may be faced with financial difficulties in adopting new 
technology. Ownership may also matter. Typically, state-owned enterprises or other public 
entities, which may be covered in the sample, are often irresponsive to price signals. They 
may continue to use as much energy, labor and other input as they need.  
 













































































































































The difference in price elasticities across countries remains consistent even if some firm-
level unobservable characteristics are partially taken into account. With the 2005 data 
merged with the 2009 BEEPS, the fixed-effect SUR models are estimated; Albania and 
Macedonia are estimated to have the relatively elastic demand for energy, though the levels 
of elasticities are different from the cross-section case (Table 7).
34 35 Note that the sample 
data are highly unbalanced; the samples have an overlap of only about 10 percent, as far as 
the observations have sufficient data items to estimate the cost function under the current 
approach. Therefore, the models do not eliminate all the heterogeneity in firms but partially 
                                                 
34 In addition, the panel analysis incorporated more detailed sectoral classification; the manufacturing sector can 
be disaggregated. As the result, 18 industrial dummy variables are included.   
35 The estimated cost functions are presented in Appendix Tables A9.    - 33 -
control for some unobservables at the firm and much broader levels, e.g., countries and 
sectors.  
 
Table 7. Price elasticity of energy demand by unbalanced panel analysis   
Pooled model
All 7 countries  –0.159 (0.044) ***
Separate models
Albania –0.434 (0.090) ***
Bosnia & Herzegovina –0.261 (0.089) ***
Bulgaria –0.236 (0.056) ***
Croatia –0.276 (0.067) ***
Macedonia –0.370 (0.133) ***
Romania –0.209 (0.077) ***
Serbia –0.111 (0.132)






By industry, construction and manufacturing seem to have relatively low price elasticities of 
energy demand, though the frontier analysis generates insignificant coefficients (Table 8). 
With the pooled SUR regression estimated with the 2005 data and evaluated at the sample 
means of each industry, the elasticities are estimated at less than 0.2 in the construction and 
manufacturing sectors (Figure 15).
36 In other industries, which mainly belong to the service 
sector, the energy demand can be considered more elastic. The main results are found 
unchanged when the cost function is estimated for each industry separately, even though the 
level of the elasticities is different.
37 An important policy implication from the Ramsey rule 
is that governments should charge more on the construction and manufacturing industries to 
maximize economic efficiency, because their demand are less likely to react to high tariffs. 
However, as already discussed, an application of the Ramsey rule to the real economy may 
raise the equity concern and the risk of reducing competitiveness of key industries. It may not 
be justifiable that two companies consuming the same amount of electricity are charged 
                                                 
36 One unexpected result may be that the price elasticity of the manufacturing sector is not statistically 
insignificant in the SFA model. In general, it is expected that manufacturing would be more energy intensive 
and more flexible in their technology choice.  
37 In this case, the country-specific fixed-effects are included, rather than the industry-specific ones. For the 
mining sector, there is no sufficient observation to estimate the assumed cost function (Equation (1)).    - 34 -
different prices just because they belong to different industries. And heavily charged 
industries will be losing competitiveness, if their products are tradables.  
 
Table 8. Price elasticity of energy demand by industry  
All industries –0.403 (0.021) *** –0.366 (0.168) ** …
By industry: 
   Mining –0.451 (0.017) *** –0.532 (0.099) *** …
   Construction –0.165 (0.052) *** 0.145 (0.538) –0.446 (0.118) ***
   Manufacturing –0.205 (0.038) *** 1.584 (2.266) –0.348 (0.047) ***
   Transport –0.467 (0.014) *** –0.529 (0.082) *** –0.237 (0.044) ***
   Trade –0.416 (0.022) *** –0.443 (0.156) *** –0.340 (0.103) ***
   Real estate –0.473 (0.014) *** –0.561 (0.075) *** –0.742 (0.099) ***
   Hotels & restaurant –0.459 (0.015) *** –0.524 (0.089) *** –0.895 (0.151) ***
   Other services –0.431 (0.021) *** –0.473 (0.131) *** 0.071 (0.225)
SUR
The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 
1% level significance, respectively. 
SFA








































































































































































Conditional energy demand elasticity with respect to output  
The implied conditional factor demand elasticity with respect to output can also be calculated 
by evaluating the SUR results at the sample means. The average response of nonresidential 
energy demand to a marginal shock in output is estimated at 0.056 in the pooled model but 
ranges from 0.07 to 0.17 in the country-specific models (Table 9). Hence, if the output 
demand declines exogenously by 10 percent, the nonresidential demand for energy would 
decrease by 0.7 to 1.7 percent. Recall, again, that the majority of enterprises in the economy 
normally spend 5 to 9 percent of total costs for energy consumption. Therefore, the marginal 
impact of changes in any single factor price is of necessity partial. Also it is noteworthy that   - 35 -
the figure is the average effect. Energy-intensive industries are outliers in the sample, and 
their behavior may not be well captured in this average elasticity. As indicated in 
Equation (8), the conditional factor demand elasticity tends to be larger if firms spend more 
for energy (i.e., higher cost share SE and higher unit cost C/Y).  
 
In cross-country comparison, Albania and Croatia are found to have high conditional energy 
demand elasticities with respect to output (Figure 16). Given an economic downturn, the 
industrial demand for energy is expected to respond relatively quickly in those countries. In 
Bulgaria and Macedonia, the energy demand will decline in response to a demand reduction 
for product, but relatively modestly.  
 
Table 9. Conditional energy demand elasticity with respect to output 
SUR
Pooled model

















*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% 
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Cost elasticity with respect to energy prices   
The estimated cost parameters allow us to infer the cost response to a possible change in 
energy prices. When evaluating the SUR results at the sample means, the energy price 
elasticity of total costs is estimated at 0.15 for all samples, meaning that a 10 percent increase 
in energy prices would result in increasing firm costs by 1.5 percent (Table 10). This is a 
marginal effect, holding everything else constant. In reality, however, an increase in energy 
prices would incentivize firms to economize on energy consumption and replace it with other 
inputs, if possible. Therefore, the net impact of increased energy prices on total costs may be 
much more moderate. In fact, the average propensity of energy spending is about 5 to 9 
percent of total costs (see Figure 7), which is equalized to the energy price elasticity of costs 
in theory. 
  
By country, Bulgaria has the highest elasticity of 0.148, followed by Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Figure 17). In the short run, these countries are considered more vulnerable to 
instantaneous energy price increases. In the same vein, these countries may also be potential 
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Table 10. Cost elasticity with respect to energy prices  
SUR
Pooled model

















*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level significance, respectively.   
 




































































































































Other characteristics of estimated cost functions 
Besides price elasticities, there are at least two important characteristics of the estimated cost 
structure of SEE firms. From the industrial organization point of view, first, one interesting 
question is whether the cost function exhibits economies of scale in production.
38 When 
evaluated at the sample means, the output elasticities of costs in the pooled models shown in 
Table 4 are estimated at 0.956 with a standard error of 0.008 and 0.968 with a standard error 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Kolstad and Turnovsky (1998), Kleit and Terrell (2001), and Filippini and Wild (2001).    - 38 -
of 0.007, respectively (Table 11). The estimates are strongly significant and different from 
unity. It is implied that firms could produce more at relatively small additional operating 
costs. For instance, every input of $95.6 or $96.8 could produce a value of $100, leaving a 
profit of $4.4 or $3.2.  
 
However, the degree of economies of scale in production may differ among countries. The 
hypothesis that the output elasticity of cost is significantly different from unity can be 
rejected at the conventional 5 percent level for only Bulgaria and Romania (Table 11). This 
seems reasonable because these two countries are the two largest in the SEE region. It is 
likely that those economies would benefit from economies of scale and agglomeration in 
production and service provision. On the other hand, the rest are much smaller, except for 
Serbia.
39 In those countries, it may be more difficult to take advantage of the scale effect in 
any economic activity.  
 
Table 11. Output elasticity of total costs  
SUR SFA
Pooled model
All 7 countries  0.956 *** 0.968 ***
(0.008) (0.008)
Excluding Albania 0.954 *** 0.964 ***
(0.009) (0.009)
Separate models
Albania 0.992 *** ...
(0.014) ...
Bosnia & Herzegovina 0.986 *** 1.007 ***
(0.024) (0.030)
Bulgaria 0.925 *** 0.907 ***
(0.028) (0.041)
Croatia 0.986 *** 0.979 ***
(0.015) (0.014)
Macedonia 0.997 *** 1.039 ***
(0.029) (0.032)
Romania 0.942 *** 0.967 ***
(0.012) (0.013)
Serbia 0.990 *** 1.001 ***
(0.013) (0.010)
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
significance, respectively.   
 
                                                 
39 The population of Romania is about 12 million. Bulgaria has a population of 7.6 million. Serbia also has 7.4 
million. The other SEE countries have 2 to 4 million of population.    - 39 -
The second characteristic revealed by the estimated cost function is that the poor quality of 
public electricity services might have an adverse effect on firm costs. However, the statistical 
significance is still open to argument. Based on the pooled models, the cost elasticities with 
respect to infrastructure quality measures,  1 P Z  and  2 P Z , are evaluated at the sample means 
(Table 12). It is found that the elasticity with respect to power outage duration is significantly 
positive at 0.015, meaning that quick recovery from power outages would help enterprises 
avoid unnecessary extra costs and contribute to improving firm competitiveness. However, 
the other elasticities are statistically insignificant, though largely positive as expected. By 
country, the country-specific models for Bulgaria and Macedonia provide the positive and 
significant cost elasticity associated with the average duration of power outages.  
 
Table 12. Cost elasticity with respect to power service quality  
ZP1 ZP2 ZP1 ZP2
Pooled model
All 7 countries  0.007 0.008 –0.009 0.015 *
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Excluding Albania 0.001 0.007 –0.002 0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)




Estimated technical (in)efficiency  
The stochastic-frontier analysis with pooled data allows us to assess to what extent individual 
firms are economically inefficient. A technical efficiency index is computed as the distance 
of the linearly predicted cost from the possible frontier (Equation (9)). On average, the 
sample enterprises are predicted to be operating 0.53 percent below the maximum possible 
efficient frontier (Table 13). This can be understood as the average technical inefficiency 
among typical firms in the SEE transition economies. The measured inefficiency seems to 
vary from country to country. While Croatia has a minimum technical inefficiency of 0.26 
percent, Bulgaria has a maximum inefficiency of 0.93 percent (Figure 18). For the rest, the 
average technical inefficiency is around 0.4 percent.  
 
It is also shown that the service industry involves more technical inefficiency than the 
secondary sector. In the real estate, hotels and restaurants, and other service industries, the   - 40 -
potential technical inefficiency is predicted to exceed 0.8 percent of total costs. Mining is 
considered the most efficient industry in our sample.  
 
Table 13. Average predicted technical inefficiency by country and by sector (% of total costs)  
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
All sample 990 0.53 0.94 0.000 10.01
By country:
   Albania 118 0.38 0.45 0.001 2.63
   Bosnia & Herzegovina 79 0.49 0.81 0.004 4.55
   Bulgaria 141 0.93 1.45 0.001 6.67
   Croatia 172 0.26 0.44 0.000 2.71
   Macedonia 89 0.57 0.76 0.002 4.35
   Romania 269 0.58 1.05 0.003 10.01
   Serbia 122 0.48 0.84 0.002 5.01
By industry: 
   Mining 16 0.21 0.32 0.004 1.21
   Construction 94 0.27 0.36 0.002 2.09
   Manufacturing 403 0.40 0.66 0.001 5.56
   Transport 72 0.37 0.74 0.003 5.56
   Trade 226 0.56 0.81 0.000 5.56
   Real estate 65 0.87 1.52 0.006 6.67
   Hotels & restaurant 67 0.83 1.14 0.003 4.55
   Other services 47 1.52 2.00 0.016 10.01  
 


















































































































































By size of firms, not surprisingly, small and medium enterprises are found relatively 
inefficient (Table 14). The average firm’s technical inefficiency is estimated at 1.66 percent 
of total costs, if its annual sales are less than US$199,000. But for large firms whose outturn 
exceeds US$2.5 million, technical inefficiency may account for only 0.02 percent of all 
operating costs. By labor intensity, enterprises relying more on labor input tend to be less 
efficient. The evidence seems to be consistent with a common view that labor issues, such as   - 41 -
over-employment and low labor quality, are among the most serious constraints on firm 
efficiency in transition economies.  
 
Finally, energy-intensive firms look less efficient in economic terms. This may be able to be 
interpreted to mean that some fraction of the predicted technical inefficiency would be 
relevant to firm spending on energy. This may be because of the existing energy use 
inefficiency embedded in equipment and production systems or because of some extra costs 
caused by the existing poor quality of public infrastructure services.  
 
Table 14. Average predicted technical inefficiency by firm characteristics (% of total costs)  
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
By firm size: 
   Y < 199 246 1.66 1.34 0.506 10.01
   199 < Y < 612 246 0.35 0.13 0.164 0.86
   612 < Y < 2,451 248 0.11 0.05 0.038 0.25
   Y > 2,451 250 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.05
By labor intensity: 
   S L < 0.11 248 0.28 0.75 0.000 10.01
   0.11 < S L < 0.196 246 0.44 0.70 0.001 4.55
   0.196 < S L < 0.287 248 0.59 0.96 0.001 6.67
   S L > 0.287 248 0.82 1.19 0.004 6.67
By enregy intensity: 
   S E < 0.029 247 0.23 0.34 0.000 2.38
   0.029 < S E < 0.054 248 0.54 0.89 0.001 5.27
   0.054 < S E < 0.099 247 0.60 1.03 0.002 6.67
   S E > 0.099 248 0.76 1.20 0.001 10.01  
 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS   
 
The following discusses some policy implications of the above findings under simplified 
circumstances. This is only for illustration purposes; the exact situation of each country may 
be characterized differently, depending on the specific focus, and it is also changing over 
time (e.g., IEA, 2008; IPA, 2009). Of particular note, the discussion mainly characterizes the 
situation around the sample year of the used BEEP data (i.e., in 2004) and may not reflect the 
latest developments in each country, for instance, prices (Figure 8). It also ignores other 
energy sources than electricity. Accordingly, the gap between our imputed energy price and 
the actual non-residential electricity price per kWh could be large, as observed in Bulgaria 
and Romania. This is a clear limitation to the interpretation of the results in the electricity   - 42 -
context, when there are significant energy alternatives, such as natural gas. Even one of the 
basic dimensions of energy policy needs to be assessed much more carefully.
 40  
 
Based on the general discussion in Section III, Croatia and Romania are characterized by 
their particularly high nonresidential electricity tariffs. Other countries are assumed to have 
relatively low rates. The estimation results indicate that the price elasticity of demand would 
be high in Albania and Macedonia (Figure 14), while the energy demand elasticity with 
respect to final output is high in Albania and Croatia (Figure 17). In addition, it is shown that 
technical inefficiency, some of which could be associated with the pattern of energy 
consumption, is high in Bulgaria, followed by Macedonia and Romania. Finally, based on the 
discussion on electricity intensity of the economy, suppose that Macedonia and other 
countries, such as Bulgaria and Serbia, have a particularly significant amount of energy 
demand from energy-intensive exporting industries, such as iron, steel and nonmetal 
minerals. These conditions are illustrated in Figure 19.  
 
Predicted demand response to energy crises  
Consider an exogenous increase in energy prices. The industrial energy consumption would 
react strongly in Albania and Macedonia. In both countries, the nonresidential electricity 
tariffs are not extremely high. Therefore, adjusting prices would be one of the effective 
policy options to balance demand with supply and strengthen the financial viability and 
sustainability of the energy sector. One possible setback in the case of Macedonia is that the 
country’s key industries consuming a lot of energy might also lose competitiveness and 
reduce production to a large extent or perhaps cease producing. Since the country is heavily 
dependent on those industries for exports, some other structural adjustments may be needed 
in tandem with energy price refinements from the broader economic policy perspective. By 
contrast, Albania may be able to rely easily on the price instrument.  
 
                                                 
40 Obviously, further significant efforts are necessary to improve the process of data generation for assessing 
more specific energy policies in the region.    - 43 -
Another important policy interpretation of the measured large elasticities is this: Suppose that 
public utility’s energy prices increases. Then, firms might be likely to switch their energy 
sources from public utilities to private backup generators in these countries. This may 
fundamentally stem from the firms’ distrust in the public infrastructure services. In Albania, 
nearly 15 percent of total sales are estimated to be lost due to power outages (Enterprise 
Surveys, 2007). About 80 percent of firms in the country have their own backup generators, 
which are estimated to have generated some 30 percent of firm electricity consumption in 
2006. With poor quality public services, firms are more motivated to rely on self-protective 
measures, which are normally costly for the economy as a whole.  
 
Unlike Albania and Macedonia, the expected demand response is predicted to be very limited 
in the rest of the countries considered: Croatia, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria 
and Serbia. In the first two countries, in addition, the electricity tariffs are already 
significantly high. A risk is evident when these countries focus on price adjustments to 
balance demand and supply: Electricity prices may be skyrocketing without visible response 
from consumers. In this case, pricing cannot be the only solution.
41 Notably, this does not 
mean that pricing would be useless. It is still an essential element in the sector reform to 
achieve full cost-recovery and phase out cross-subsidies, as stipulated by IEA (2008) and 
others.
42 One useful, complementary policy measure may be to facilitate reduction in 
technical inefficiency. Recall that Romania’s predicted technical inefficiency at the firm level 
is twice as high as the regional best performer in this regard, Croatia. Hence, the country can 
                                                 
41 For instance, Romania has a much low price elasticity of –0.21; thus, one cannot expect that any negative 
supply shock would induce firms to reduce energy consumption. They would keep consume energy as they are 
doing. Accordingly, the domestic energy market would come under enormous upward price pressure. But 
Romania’s nonresidential electricity price, for example, reached 12.5 U.S. cents per kWh. In this regard, the 
past history of price adjustments reflected in Figure 6 seems to have been consistent with the paper’s estimation 
result.  
42 For instance, IEA (2008) calls for further end-use price adjustments to finalize full cost-recovery in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Serbia. Our analysis implies that pricing may not be the only solution but should be 
combined with other incentive measures. The difference in policy emphasis is attributable to the difference in 
methodology and scope of analysis. This paper focuses on micro behavior and analyzes the nonresidential 
energy market, while most of the earlier documents discussed a wider range of issues at the country level. 
Although the claims are not necessarily contradictory, it is noteworthy that direct policy implications could 
appear different.    - 44 -
improve firm efficiency furthermore, for example, through improving energy efficiency and 
infrastructure qualities. Filippini and Hunt (2009) discuss energy efficiency in OECD 
member countries under the SFA framework. Our paper has been shown that small and/or 
labor-intensive enterprises have more room to improve technical efficiency.  
 
If the estimated results are interpreted straightforwardly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria 
and Serbia may be able to rely on pricing, but only to a certain extent. In these countries, 
some room for price increases may remain. However, the expected demand response are 
weak and thus, they may be faced with the same risk as Croatia and Romania. According to 
our estimation results, a risk of damaging the real economy may not be large in Serbia, 
because of its low cost elasticity with respect to energy prices. But the risk may remain high 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bulgaria where the cost elasticity is high (Figure 17). 
Without doubt, there is room for technical efficiency improvement. Bulgaria is estimated to 
have the lowest technical efficacy in the region. The average technical efficiency of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is also 80 percent lower than Croatia.  
 
Figure 19. Estimated price-demand relationship in SEE countries given an energy crisis  
Source: Author’s illustration. 
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Predicted demand response to global economic downturns 
There are two possible consequences of a worldwide slowdown in economic activity.
43 First, 
it can reduce the general demand for energy and thus improve the global energy balance. 
International energy prices would decline. Therefore, energy-scarce countries could purchase 
electricity or fuel sources for domestic power generation at relatively low costs and might be 
able to have excess supply of energy. If governments translate this favorable market 
condition into their domestic energy tariffs, the demand for energy would increase. This may 
be particularly relevant to Macedonia where the energy-intensive industries are significant in 
production and exports. In the rest of the SEE countries, the firms’ response on the real side 
would be limited. But the downward pressure on domestic energy prices would be large if the 
shock is accommodated (Figure 20).  
 
Second, however, there is another consequence for the demand for products, especially for 
material industries. Albania and Croatia, where the conditional energy demand elasticities 
with respect to output are estimated to be high, would experience large reductions in the 
nonresidential demand for energy, given the global economic downturn. On the other hand, 
let us assume that the energy demand elasticities would be negligible in the rest of countries. 
In Albania, the expected impact of reduced energy tariffs would be potentially large, but the 
effect might be offset by an energy demand shift caused by demand reduction in products. In 
Croatia, the pricing effect is expected to be small, but the country may experience a large 
reduction in energy demand because of the economic stagnation.  
 
How the authorities should react to these expected consequences is out of the scope of the 
current paper. But the paper provides some insight on what they could do. The expected 
reduction in energy demand may create some room to carry out other energy policies for 
                                                 
43 An important implicit assumption underlying this argument is that the demand response to output would be 
symmetric and marginal. Since our models are mainly estimated with the 2005 data, it is not necessarily clear 
whether it would be appropriate to interpret the results in the context of the current global economic downturn 
since 2008. The demand response could be asymmetrically rigid or elastic, and given a significant slowdown, 
the cost structure might change. The discussion here is valid as long as a marginal shock in output is considered.    - 46 -
balancing energy supply and demand. The regional energy trading and infrastructure 
integration, as intended in the SEE region, could contribute to expanding policy options and 
improving energy security and invulnerability to external shocks among the regional 
countries. Countries with the price-elastic energy demand would likely benefit from the 
reduced energy (import) prices.  
 
Figure 20. Estimated price-demand relationship in SEE countries given an economic crisis  
Source: Author’s illustration. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
The world economy has experienced significant hicks and uncertainties in international 
energy prices since 2000. A series of increases in energy prices reveal that South Eastern 
Europe is one of the vulnerable regions to such external energy shocks.  
 
The paper recasts light on the relationship between the price of and the demand for energy in 
the SEE countries. By estimating the price elasticity of demand, it examines to what extent 
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demand would be affected by changes in energy prices. The price-demand relationship is 
essential in designing and implementing some price and/or supply adjustments.  
 
Although there are a number of empirical and data issues, the evidence tentatively shows that 
the price elasticity of industrial energy demand is about –0.4 on average. But it may vary 
significantly depending on the country; Albania and Macedonia are estimated to have a 
highly elastic demand. The elasticity seems to be on the order of–0.7 to –0.8. For the rest of 
the SEE countries, the elasticities appear relatively low at –0.2 to –0.4. Therefore, in Albania 
and Macedonia, price adjustments would be one of the effective policy options to balance 
demand with supply, while strengthening the financial viability and sustainability of the 
energy sector. In other countries, the demand response would be weak. Hence, other policy 
measures, such as facilitation of energy efficiency at the firm level and improvements in the 
quality of public infrastructure services, may also be required to address the energy-sector 
issues.  
 
In addition, it is shown that the energy demand structure in some countries would be very 
responsive to the general economic trend. The conditional energy demand elasticity with 
respect to output is estimated at 0.08 to 0.17 in the region. But the elasticity is relatively high 
in two countries: Albania and Croatia. In these countries, energy demand may decline in spite 
of favorable energy input prices. This is because energy demand is also affected by output 
demand and the pricing effect may be partly offset by the real impact of the global economic 
downturn.  
   - 48 -
APPENDIX  
 










βWL WL –0.0043 (0.0061) –0.1375 (0.0222)
***
βWL WE 0.1262 (0.0031)
*** 0.2222 (0.0101)
***
βWL WK –0.1316 (0.0036)
*** –0.1628 (0.0130)
***
βWE WE 0.0738 (0.0040)
*** 0.0523 (0.0166)
***
βWE WK 0.0092 (0.0040)
** 0.0174 (0.0136)





βZ P 1 0.0017 (0.0022) 0.0012 (0.0018)
βZ P 2 0.0134 (0.0085) 0.0161 (0.0092)
*
βZ P 1Z P 1 4.0E-06 (1.7E-05) 6.0E-06 (1.4E-05)
βZ P 1Z P 2 –5.1E-05 (1.3E-04) –3.0E-05 (6.8E-05)
βZ P 2Z P 2 4.0E-04 (5.6E-04) 8.9E-05 (4.2E-04)
βYZP 1 –1.5E-05 (3.8E-04) 4.3E-06 (3.7E-04)
βYZP 2 –6.3E-04 (1.1E-03) 6.4E-04 (9.5E-04)
βWL Z P 1 1.4E-04 (2.4E-04) 5.7E-05 (2.5E-04)
βWL Z P 2 –1.2E-03 (1.0E-03) –1.6E-03 (1.1E-03)
βWE Z P 1 3.9E-04 (2.6E-04) 5.7E-04 (8.3E-04)
βWE Z P 2 2.0E-03 (1.4E-03) 5.5E-03 (3.0E-03)
*
Construction 0.0331 (0.0658) 0.0659 (0.0581)
Manufacturing 0.0976 (0.0615) 0.1262 (0.0522)
**
Transport –0.0504 (0.0674) 0.1167 (0.0712)
*
Trade 0.0350 (0.0633) 0.0969 (0.0544)
*
Real estate –0.0625 (0.0674) –0.0142 (0.0616)
Restaurant & hotel 0.0360 (0.0677) 0.0724 (0.0672)






   Cost equation 72735.2 87047.6
   Wage share equation 1972.6
   Energy cost share equat 8286.6
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 
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Table A2. Estimated cost function: Macedonia  
β Y 0.8307 (0.1013)
*** 0.9039 (0.0886)
***
β YY 0.0234 (0.0150) 0.0174 (0.0151)
β W L 0.8546 (0.0602)
*** 1.0472 (0.1032)
***
β W E –0.3004 (0.0471)
*** –0.5338 (0.0863)
***
β W LW L –0.0549 (0.0248)
** –0.1022 (0.0738)
β W LW E 0.1701 (0.0086)
*** 0.2212 (0.0133)
***
β W LW K –0.1590 (0.0131)
*** –0.1695 (0.0396)
***
β W EW E 0.0146 (0.0096) –0.0148 (0.0260)
β W EW K 0.0172 (0.0106)
* 0.0112 (0.0252)
β YW L 0.0069 (0.0077) 0.0060 (0.0092)
β YW E 0.0055 (0.0068) 0.0139 (0.0138)
β Z P1 0.0377 (0.0297)
** 0.0447 (0.0240)
*
β Z P2 –0.1441 (0.0678) –0.1280 (0.0375)
***
β Z P1Z P1 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0005 (0.0001)
***
β Z P1Z P2 –0.0036 (0.0083) –0.0093 (0.0059)
β Z P2Z P2 –0.0328 (0.0161)
** –0.0364 (0.0096)
***
β YZP1 –0.0073 (0.0044)
* 0.0021 (0.0030)
β YZP2 0.0403 (0.0170)
** 0.0347 (0.0156)
**
β W LZ P1 0.0014 (0.0009) 0.0009 (0.0018)
β W LZ P2 –0.0025 (0.0074) –0.0055 (0.0086)
β W EZ P1 0.0001 (0.0006) 0.0233 (0.0074)
***
β W EZ P2 –0.0033 (0.0072) –0.0168 (0.0155)
Construction –0.1038 (0.1910) –0.2256 (0.1067)
**
Manufacturing –0.0034 (0.1909) –0.1878 (0.1093)
*
Transport –0.2645 (0.2104) –0.5503 (0.1838)
***
Trade –0.0450 (0.1934) –0.2553 (0.1057)
**
Real estate –0.0407 (0.2127) –0.0754 (0.1477)
Restaurant & hotel –0.2095 (0.2073) –0.3000 (0.1392)
**






   Cost equation 14591.1 519288.9
   Wage share equation 419.8
   Energy cost share equation 918.0
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The standard 
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Table A3. Estimated cost function: Serbia  











βWL WL –0.0694 (0.0196)
*** –0.2494 (0.0528)
***
βWL WE 0.2027 (0.0084)
*** 0.3097 (0.0215)
***
βWL WK –0.1789 (0.0104)
*** –0.1972 (0.0302)
***
βWE WE 0.0460 (0.0100)
*** 0.0026 (0.0158)
βWE WK –0.0039 (0.0092) 0.0145 (0.0184)
βYWL 0.0001 (0.0041) –0.0060 (0.0035)
*
βYWE –0.0021 (0.0048) 0.0102 (0.0118)
βZ P 1 0.0082 (0.0100) –0.0033 (0.0068)
βZ P 2 0.0035 (0.0161) 0.0098 (0.0106)
βZ P 1Z P 1 1.8E-05 (1.6E-04) 9.3E-05 (1.3E-04)
βZ P 1Z P 2 –3.3E-05 (9.1E-04) 1.5E-04 (7.3E-04)
βZ P 2Z P 2 6.8E-04 (9.2E-04) 3.9E-04 (6.0E-04)
βYZP 1 –5.1E-04 (9.4E-04) 4.7E-04 (7.5E-04)
βYZP 2 –7.8E-04 (2.0E-03) –1.3E-04 (1.9E-03)
βWL Z P 1 –9.8E-04 (8.9E-04) –1.4E-03 (9.0E-04)
βWL Z P 2 –7.8E-04 (2.2E-03) –3.2E-04 (1.5E-03)
βWE Z P 1 1.2E-03 (8.0E-04) 6.5E-04 (1.2E-03)
βWE Z P 2 1.1E-03 (2.3E-03) 4.1E-03 (6.4E-03)
Construction 0.1052 (0.0874) 0.0460 (0.0595)
Manufacturing 0.0903 (0.0830) –0.0077 (0.0587)
Transport 0.0228 (0.0925) 0.0218 (0.0631)
Trade 0.1092 (0.0856) 0.0201 (0.0615)
Real estate 0.0769 (0.0902) 0.0218 (0.0596)
Restaurant & hotel –0.0138 (0.0895) –0.0227 (0.0725)






   Cost equation 35033.4 110989.2
   Wage share equation 715.3
   Energy cost share equat 2136.7
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 
5% and 1% level significance, respectively. 
SUR SFA
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Table A4. Estimated cost function: Croatia  
β Y 0.9975 (0.0468)
*** 1.0305 (0.0390)
***
β YY –0.0009 (0.0058) –0.0057 (0.0048)
β W L 0.8792 (0.0414)
*** 1.1539 (0.0697)
***
β W E –0.1848 (0.0365)
*** –0.5728 (0.0663)
***
β W LW L –0.0910 (0.0131)
*** –0.1900 (0.0538)
***
β W LW E 0.1625 (0.0064)
*** 0.2849 (0.0227)
***
β W LW K –0.1241 (0.0087)
*** –0.1895 (0.0423)
***
β W EW E 0.0666 (0.0068)
*** 0.0296 (0.0130)
**
β W EW K –0.0211 (0.0060)
*** –0.0167 (0.0120)
β YW L 0.0022 (0.0043) 0.0020 (0.0055)
β YW E 4.8E-05 (4.0E-03) –4.4E-03 (6.8E-03)
β Z P1 4.1E-03 (1.2E-02) 2.3E-02 (8.6E-03)
***
β Z P2 1.6E-02 (1.4E-02) 1.2E-02 (1.0E-02)
β Z P1Z P1 2.2E-05 (3.0E-04) –2.0E-04 (2.2E-04)
β Z P1Z P2 –1.7E-04 (5.6E-04) –6.4E-04 (3.7E-04)
*
β Z P2Z P2 1.9E-03 (1.2E-03)
* 2.2E-03 (1.0E-03)
**
β YZP1 –6.0E-05 (1.7E-03) –5.1E-03 (2.5E-03)
**
β YZP2 –1.1E-03 (1.8E-03) 6.3E-04 (1.8E-03)
β W LZ P1 4.7E-04 (1.6E-03) 6.0E-03 (2.9E-03)
**
β W LZ P2 –3.6E-03 (2.6E-03) –5.3E-03 (3.1E-03)
*
β W EZ P1 4.3E-04 (1.3E-03) –4.0E-03 (2.8E-03)
β W EZ P2 3.6E-03 (2.0E-03) 7.4E-03 (3.7E-03)
**
Construction –0.0433 (0.0761) –0.0028 (0.0424)




Trade –0.0183 (0.0719) 0.0020 (0.0433)
Real estate –0.0513 (0.0750) 0.0133 (0.0444)
Restaurant & hotel 0.0926 (0.0841) 0.0813 (0.0475)
*






   Cost equation 44382.0 158997.3
   Wage share equation 822.7
   Energy cost share equation 2002.1
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The standard 
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Table A5. Estimated cost function: Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Bosnia & Herzegovina Bosnia & Herzegovina
β Y 0.8420 (0.1089)
*** 0.9498 (0.1235)
***
β YY 0.0155 (0.0164) 0.0046 (0.0234)
β W L 0.7177 (0.0615)
*** 0.9151 (0.0669)
***
β W E –0.0150 (0.0569) –0.2476 (0.1545)
*
β W LW L –0.0493 (0.0222)
** –0.1704 (0.0662)
***
β W LW E 0.1532 (0.0102)
*** 0.2767 (0.0371)
***
β W LW K –0.1476 (0.0122)
*** –0.2085 (0.0470)
***
β W EW E 0.0775 (0.0109)
*** 0.1039 (0.0334)
***
β W EW K –0.0080 (0.0102) –0.0300 (0.0282)
β YW L 0.0058 (0.0083) 0.0038 (0.0123)
β YW E –0.0127 (0.0078)
* –0.0079 (0.0226)
β Z P1 0.0475 (0.0417) 0.0451 (0.0395)
β Z P2 0.0044 (0.1060) –0.0241 (0.1441)
β Z P1Z P1 –0.0053 (0.0031)
* –0.0028 (0.0030)
β Z P1Z P2 0.0045 (0.0028) 0.0032 (0.0022)
β Z P2Z P2 0.0007 (0.0027) 0.0030 (0.0023)
β YZP1 –0.0034 (0.0053) –0.0060 (0.0044)
β YZP2 0.0006 (0.0145) 0.0129 (0.0151)
β W LZ P1 –0.0013 (0.0028) 0.0015 (0.0031)
β W LZ P2 0.0016 (0.0064) –0.0018 (0.0156)
β W EZ P1 –0.0010 (0.0031) –0.0040 (0.0073)
β W EZ P2 0.0055 (0.0047) 0.0259 (0.0324)
Construction 0.4263 (0.1977)
** 0.4147 (0.2630)





Real estate 0.1973 (0.2104) 0.1672 (0.2379)
Restaurant & hotel 0.2660 (0.1902) 0.2872 (0.2377)






   Cost equation 10019.0 ...
   Wage share equation 351.2
   Energy cost share equation 897.6
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The standard 
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Table A6. Estimated cost function: Romania  
β Y 0.7454 (0.0537)
*** 0.7371 (0.0698)
***
β YY 0.0132 (0.0080)
* 0.0099 (0.0098)
β W L 0.4952 (0.0336)
*** 0.6455 (0.0825)
***
β W E 0.3364 (0.0333)
*** 0.2021 (0.1139)
*
β W LW L 0.0323 (0.0137)
** –0.0878 (0.0431)
**
β W LW E 0.1338 (0.0065)
*** 0.2624 (0.0194)
***
β W LW K –0.1449 (0.0079)
*** –0.2257 (0.0235)
***
β W EW E 0.0785 (0.0079)
*** 0.0150 (0.0260)
β W EW K 0.0224 (0.0074)
*** 0.0672 (0.0172)
***
β YW L 0.0095 (0.0051)
* 0.0238 (0.0084)
***
β YW E –0.0404 (0.0049)
*** –0.0699 (0.0114)
***
β Z P1 0.0006 (0.0040) 0.0019 (0.0021)
β Z P2 –0.0273 (0.0222) –0.0096 (0.0261)
β Z P1Z P1 –3.7E-05 (2.9E-05) –3.0E-05 (3.6E-05)
β Z P1Z P2 –1.5E-04 (1.5E-04) –2.3E-05 (1.1E-04)
β Z P2Z P2 2.2E-03 (1.0E-03)
** 1.5E-03 (9.2E-04)
*
β YZP1 1.5E-04 (6.2E-04) –9.6E-05 (5.1E-04)
β YZP2 1.6E-03 (3.0E-03) 3.6E-04 (3.4E-03)
β W LZ P1 2.6E-04 (5.6E-04) 1.1E-03 (8.2E-04)
β W LZ P2 –3.1E-03 (2.3E-03) –4.5E-03 (3.5E-03)
β W EZ P1 1.7E-05 (4.9E-04) 1.4E-04 (1.5E-03)
β W EZ P2 –7.7E-04 (2.2E-03) 1.6E-03 (3.9E-03)
Construction –0.0931 (0.0763) –0.1046 (0.1108)
Manufacturing 0.0056 (0.0659) –0.0431 (0.1070)
Transport 0.0179 (0.0869) 0.0529 (0.1345)
Trade 0.0222 (0.0705) –0.0214 (0.1043)
Real estate
Restaurant & hotel –0.0214 (0.0845) –0.0800 (0.1179)






   Cost equation 274589.3 25536.8
   Wage share equation 491.2
   Energy cost share equation 2267.5
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The standard 
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Table A7. Estimated cost function: Bulgaria  
β Y 0.9272 (0.0656)
*** 0.8904 (0.0524)
***
β YY –0.0033 (0.0105) –0.0002 (0.0112)
β W L 0.6661 (0.0454)
*** 0.9846 (0.0521)
***
β W E 0.1397 (0.0339)
*** 0.0447 (0.0733)
β W LW L 0.0744 (0.0241)
*** –0.1666 (0.0680)
**
β W LW E 0.1348 (0.0083)
*** 0.2609 (0.0145)
***
β W LW K –0.1373 (0.0120)
*** –0.1829 (0.0305)
***
β W EW E 0.0747 (0.0070)
*** 0.0544 (0.0208)
***
β W EW K –0.0204 (0.0082)
** –0.0124 (0.0293)
β YW L –0.0135 (0.0078)
* –0.0007 (0.0093)
β YW E –0.0121 (0.0056)
** –0.0334 (0.0150)
**
β Z P1 0.0030 (0.0035) –0.0009 (0.0039)
β Z P2 –0.0136 (0.0410) 0.0561 (0.0376)
β Z P1Z P1 2.4E-04 (6.4E-05)
*** 2.7E-04 (1.2E-04)
**
β Z P1Z P2 1.3E-03 (5.6E-04)
** 1.8E-03 (8.2E-04)
**
β Z P2Z P2 –2.2E-03 (2.7E-03) –3.3E-03 (2.0E-03)
*
β YZP1 –4.2E-03 (1.2E-03)
*** –8.8E-03 (3.9E-03)
**
β YZP2 4.9E-03 (5.6E-03) 3.6E-03 (4.0E-03)
β W LZ P1 –7.3E-05 (4.8E-04) –1.4E-03 (9.4E-04)
β W LZ P2 –3.3E-03 (4.8E-03) –9.5E-03 (6.4E-03)
β W EZ P1 –1.3E-04 (3.0E-04) –1.1E-02 (5.7E-03)
**
β W EZ P2 –3.1E-03 (3.7E-03) 2.4E-02 (1.1E-02)
**
Construction –0.2253 (0.1529) –0.0173 (0.0998)





Real estate –0.3546 (0.1513)
** –0.2385 (0.0904)
***
Restaurant & hotel –0.1052 (0.1524) 0.0540 (0.0974)
Other services –0.3158 (0.1574)
** –0.1180 (0.0995)
Constant –0.0062 (0.2531) –0.1832 (0.1795)
Obs. 141 141
Chi-square
   Cost equation 11206.3 85146.5
   Wage share equation 351.1
   Energy cost share equation 672.2
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating cost. The standard 
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Table A8. Estimated cost function: Albania  
β Y 1.0954 (0.0823)
***
β YY –0.0098 (0.0106)
β W L 1.0030 (0.0508)
***
β W E –0.2873 (0.0587)
***
β W LW L –0.0517 (0.0182)
***
β W LW E 0.2110 (0.0092)
***
β W LW K –0.1817 (0.0116)
***
β W EW E 0.0124 (0.0114)
β W EW K 0.0191 (0.0112)
*
β YW L –0.0125 (0.0061)
**
β YW E 0.0022 (0.0073)
β Z P1 0.0013 (0.0007)
*
β Z P2 0.0168 (0.0487)
β Z P1Z P1 –3.5E-06 (2.6E-06)
β Z P1Z P2 6.7E-06 (5.6E-05)
β Z P2Z P2 4.6E-03 (4.8E-03)
β YZP1 –1.1E-04 (7.7E-05)
β YZP2 –1.8E-03 (5.9E-03)
β W LZ P1 –8.6E-05 (6.4E-05)
β W LZ P2 –5.7E-03 (4.2E-03)
β W EZ P1 –6.1E-05 (7.2E-05)







Real estate –0.2287 (0.1351)
*
Restaurant & hotel –0.2476 (0.1157)
**






   Cost equation 20129.7
   Wage share equation 543.2
   Energy cost share equation 1206.6
Note that the dependent variable is the logarithmic operating 
cost. The standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and 





 Table A9. Estimated cost functions by SUR with unbalanced panel data  
Bosnia & Herzegovina
βY 0.9254 (0.0693) *** 1.1788 (0.2510) *** 0.5825 (0.2285) ** 0.6896 (0.1281) *** 0.9932 (0.1070) *** 0.2217 (0.3343) 1.0036 (0.1920) *** 1.0983 (0.1605) ***
βYY –0.0001 (0.0048) –0.0057 (0.0164) 0.0172 (0.0151) 0.0175 (0.0090) * 0.0013 (0.0066) 0.0477 (0.0240) ** –0.0111 (0.0135) –0.0107 (0.0110)
βWL 0.7012 (0.0395) *** 1.3564 (0.1315) *** 0.6504 (0.1222) *** 0.9675 (0.0961) *** 1.1672 (0.0812) *** 0.8231 (0.1557) *** 0.1964 (0.1045) * 0.5699 (0.0945) ***
βWE –0.1294 (0.0353) *** –0.3614 (0.1395) *** –0.4286 (0.1030) *** –0.1769 (0.0719) ** –0.7391 (0.0806) *** –0.4730 (0.1435) *** 0.0435 (0.0794) –0.1986 (0.0875) **
βWL WL –0.0332 (0.0032) *** –0.0838 (0.0089) *** –0.0502 (0.0092) *** –0.0906 (0.0086) *** –0.0696 (0.0063) *** –0.0487 (0.0117) *** 0.0130 (0.0080) * –0.0087 (0.0073)
βWL WE 0.0542 (0.0033) *** 0.0798 (0.0107) *** 0.0792 (0.0094) *** 0.0559 (0.0079) *** 0.1015 (0.0070) *** 0.0843 (0.0114) *** 0.0476 (0.0077) *** 0.0489 (0.0088) ***
βWL WK –0.0735 (0.0037) *** –0.0434 (0.0120) *** –0.0821 (0.0107) *** –0.0493 (0.0098) *** –0.0704 (0.0082) *** –0.0810 (0.0131) *** –0.1106 (0.0081) *** –0.0940 (0.0089) ***
βWE WE 0.0715 (0.0033) *** 0.0511 (0.0100) *** 0.0589 (0.0080) *** 0.0733 (0.0056) *** 0.0651 (0.0063) *** 0.0498 (0.0109) *** 0.0697 (0.0073) *** 0.0659 (0.0089) ***
βWE WK –0.0368 (0.0030) *** –0.0109 (0.0081) –0.0407 (0.0069) *** –0.0607 (0.0061) *** –0.0338 (0.0055) *** –0.0284 (0.0104) *** –0.0218 (0.0065) *** –0.0504 (0.0075) ***
βYWL 0.0002 (0.0023) –0.0125 (0.0073) * 0.0188 (0.0070) *** 0.0093 (0.0058) –0.0022 (0.0042) 0.0084 (0.0092) 0.0086 (0.0059) –0.0021 (0.0051)
βYWE –0.0071 (0.0021) *** –0.0100 (0.0081) –0.0035 (0.0054) –0.0003 (0.0041) 0.0014 (0.0036) –0.0063 (0.0082) –0.0153 (0.0047) *** 0.0006 (0.0044)
βZ P 1 0.0061 (0.0012) *** 0.0041 (0.0020) ** –0.0186 (0.0069) *** 0.0065 (0.0043) 0.0333 (0.0213) –0.0142 (0.0183) 0.0165 (0.0037) *** 0.0284 (0.0087) ***
βZ P 2 0.0207 (0.0214) 0.1538 (0.1264) –0.1742 (0.1356) 0.0609 (0.0789) –0.0025 (0.0300) 0.3007 (0.2262) 0.1040 (0.0510) ** –0.1046 (0.0712)
βZ P 1Z P 1 0.0000 (0.0000) * 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) *** 0.0000 (0.0000) *** –0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0001) –0.0000 (0.0000) –0.0000 (0.0000) ***
βZ P 1Z P 2 –0.0002 (0.0000) *** –0.0001 (0.0001) –0.0015 (0.0007) ** 0.0003 (0.0003) –0.0018 (0.0004) *** 0.0044 (0.0018) ** –0.0003 (0.0001) *** 0.0000 (0.0003)
βZ P 2Z P 2 –0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0026 (0.0072) –0.0033 (0.0014) ** –0.0020 (0.0025) 0.0021 (0.0011) * –0.0045 (0.0159) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0046 (0.0019) **
βYZP 1 –0.0004 (0.0001) *** –0.0003 (0.0001) ** 0.0003 (0.0004) –0.0005 (0.0002) ** –0.0033 (0.0015) ** 0.0004 (0.0009) –0.0011 (0.0002) *** –0.0018 (0.0006) ***
βYZP 2 –0.0012 (0.0015) –0.0082 (0.0082) 0.0113 (0.0104) –0.0064 (0.0052) 0.0000 (0.0019) –0.0187 (0.0166) –0.0089 (0.0039) *** 0.0030 (0.0047)
βWL Z P 1 –0.0002 (0.0000) *** –0.0001 (0.0001) * 0.0008 (0.0003) *** –0.0004 (0.0002) 0.0012 (0.0004) *** –0.0006 (0.0005) 0.0000 (0.0002) –0.0001 (0.0002)
βWL Z P 2 0.0000 (0.0007) –0.0065 (0.0053) 0.0100 (0.0031) *** 0.0036 (0.0041) –0.0006 (0.0022) –0.0044 (0.0085) 0.0003 (0.0008) 0.0022 (0.0031)
βWE Z P 1 –0.0000 (0.0000) –0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) –0.0008 (0.0003) *** 0.0007 (0.0004) * 0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0003 (0.0002)
βWE Z P 2 0.0003 (0.0005) –0.0001 (0.0058) –0.0007 (0.0023) –0.0034 (0.0028) 0.0007 (0.0016) 0.0007 (0.0083) 0.0003 (0.0005) 0.0008 (0.0022)
Constant –3.6748 (0.5475) *** –8.6944 (2.0752) *** –1.7627 (1.8312) –3.6681 (1.0162) *** –7.4042 (1.0011) *** –0.3075 (2.4401) –2.0012 (1.4581) –4.8233 (1.3095) ***
Obs. 1215 124 107 167 181 118 308 210
Number of dummy variables
  Sector 17 15 16 11 13 17 16 17
   F i r m  f i x e d  e f f e c t s 3 31063475
Chi-square
   Cost eq. 0.963 0.986 0.989 0.987 0.994 0.969 0.943 0.965
   Wage share eq. 0.206 -0.228 0.363 -0.179 0.089 0.127 0.406 0.372
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